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Toward the Economy of Petroleum Products

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SAVING PETROLEUM-BASE FUEL IN AGRICULTURE

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During 2 five-year plans the USSR has created a socialist agriculture which is the largest-scale agriculture in the world and which is armed with modern advanced technology. With direct party and state aid, 3,992 sovkhoses, 243,000 kolkhozes, uniting 93 percent of all peasant farms with 99.1 percent acreage under crops, and 5,818 machine-tractor stations have been organized. During the Second Five-Year Plan alone, the tractor pool of agriculture increased more than 3 times; the truck pool, 10 times; and the combine pool, 9 times. By the end of 1937, 454,500 tractors, 148,800 combines, 144,500 trucks and about 78,000 assorted stationary engines were concentrated in sovkhoses, MTS and kolkhozes. The USSR occupies ^{the} leading place in the world with regard to the number of combines. USSR agriculture occupies second place in the world (after the United States) with regard to number and capacity of tractor pool, but has considerably outstripped the United States with regard to volume of operations performed by tractors.

Arming agriculture with a tremendous number of tractors, trucks, combines, and other mechanical engines has fundamentally changed the structure of USSR agricultural power resources. In the agriculture of tsarist Russia, draught animals were the basic engine, but in USSR socialist agriculture the relative proportion of mechanical engines in the total volume of power resources comprised 64.2 percent in 1937. The USSR occupies second place in the world, after the United States, with regard to the relative proportion of mechanical engines in the total volume of power resources.

As a result of the fundamental technical rearmament of socialist agriculture and the high utilization of technology, the volume and level of mechanization of agricultural operations are rising at rates previously unheard of. In 1937 the volume of operations performed by MTS tractors on kolkhozes surpassed almost 9 times the volume of these operations in 1932.

The level of mechanization of basic kolkhoz operations during the Second Five-Year Plan rose as follows:

<u>Basic Operations</u>	<u>1933</u>	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>
Spring plowing	22.0	--	--	--	73.9
Spring sowing	6.8	9.2	14.5	30.8	42.5
Raising fallow earth	No infor-	45.9	57.1	75.7	83.2
	mation				
Harvesting grain crops	10.4	14.6	21.6	30.6	39.3
Including by combines	0.9	2.3	7.6	24.1	33.6
Harvesting sunflower	No infor-	4.8	45.2	59.7	74.8
seeds by combines	mation				
Digging sugar beets	No infor-	5.2	47.7	77.9	79.7
	mation				
Autumn plowing	23.4	34.5	47.8	65.7	67.4
Winter sowing	7.0	14.0	20.0	34.0	45.0
Thrashing	21.0	50.8	57.5	83.9	94.0

The fundamental technical rearmament of agriculture and the mechanization of the basic processes of agricultural labor caused a tremendous rise in petroleum-product consumption of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, and MTS, and caused the creation of petroleum managements at MTS and sovkhoses. It is sufficient to state that the consumption

of kerosene in agriculture in 1937 surpassed more than $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the entire production of kerosene in tsarist Russia. The consumption of gasoline in agriculture surpassed more than 7 times the entire production of it in 1913. In 1928 our agriculture consumed 6.5 percent of all fuel and lubricating materials produced, and 14.3 percent of all petroleum products sold on the domestic market. At the present time agricultural enterprises have occupied an important place in the national economy with regard to consumption of petroleum products (about 60 percent of the entire consumption). Agriculture consumes about 80 percent of all ligroin produced and more than 60 percent of all kerosene.

In the Third Five-Year Plan the pool of tractors, trucks, and all agricultural mechanical engines will grow considerably, because the complete mechanization of agricultural operations has to be completed in the Third Five-Year Plan. Diesel and gas-generator tractors must be widely used in the Third Five-Year Plan. Consequently, a considerable number of tractors will operate on heavy diesel fuel, on wood, and straw. However, the products of petroleum refining -- ligroin, kerosene, gasoline, and lubricating oils -- will nevertheless take high relative participation in providing agriculture with fuel.

Therefore the struggle for the rational organization of MTS and sovkhos fuel management, and the struggle for the economic expenditure of fuel and the substitution of cheaper types of fuel for light fuel are of exceptionally great importance to the national economy. In order to illustrate this, it can be pointed out that an economy of only 5 percent of the entire agricultural consumption of fuel and lubricating oils means a saving of 300,000 tons of fuel

annually. In terms of money, this renders a saving of 250 million rubles a year. At the same time, this essentially insignificant saving of fuel facilitates transport operations, saving 900,000 ton-kilometers of freight mileage on railroads, and significantly lowers the net cost of tractor operations and of sovkhos agricultural production. The basic element in the structure of net cost of tractor operations performed by MTS at kolkhozes is fuel expenses, comprising about 60 percent of the total expenses. In the net cost of 1 centner of grain ears on grain sovkhos of the NKSSovkhozov USSR, the expenses for fuel comprise 22-23 percent of the total.

The figures cited above are sufficiently convincing indication of the great role of MTS and sovkhos petroleum management in the petroleum consumption of the country.

During the Second Five-Year Plan certain achievements have been attained in lowering fuel expenses. Fuel expenses for 1 hectare of conditional plowing were cut from 22.4 kilograms in 1934 to 18.3 kilograms in 1937.

However, this lowering of fuel expenses took place chiefly not by means of cutting down losses, pilferage, and non-productive expenses, but as a result of the fundamental improvement of tractor quality and the development of the Stakhanovite movement in agriculture. At the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan, new, perfected Soviet STZ, KhtZ and ChTZ tractors, and universals comprised about 60 percent of the total agricultural tractor pool and old, worn-out foreign makes of tractors comprised 40 percent, but at the present time almost all the tractor pool consists of new Soviet makes.

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Enemies of the people, foul Trotsky-Bukharin agents of fascism, inveigling themselves into the direction of land agencies, sovkhozes, and MTS, have attempted by different methods to disorganize the fuel supply of agriculture, to disorganize MTS and sovkhoz petroleum management, and to frustrate the struggle for saving fuel. The sabotage has proceeded in different directions. Enemies of the people have attempted to disorganize the planning of fuel delivery. By different methods they have created a disbalance between the plan for volume of tractor operations and the demand for fuel, especially ligroin, for delivered ChTZ caterpillar tractors; this has caused masses of them to stand idle and has disrupted a number of agricultural operations in individual oblasts and krays of the USSR. For a number of krays and oblasts the selection of fuels was planned considerably lower than the demand for them. Saboteurs have also caused ruptures in individual krays and oblasts, MTS and sovkhozes, between the existing stocks and delivery of necessary tank capacity, petroleum containers, and petroleum depot equipment. This has led, on the one hand, to great strain in MTS and sovkhoz operations during the spring sowing campaign and during the harvesting operations, and, on the other hand, to tremendous fuel losses due to primitive methods of transportation, storage, and refueling.

Saboteurs have attempted in every way to disorganize sovkhoz and MTS petroleum depot management. They have disrupted the planning of funds released by the government for construction and the technical equipping of petroleum depots, and have used these funds for other purposes. Prior to 1938 the NKZ and the NKSVkhov USSR did not plan for these funds. Typical construction plans for petroleum

depots and for equipment were not approved and are missing to this day. Funds released for acquiring petroleum containers and petroleum management equipment were distributed without any record of the necessary expenditures for the installation and assembly of its equipment. Petroleum containers were delivered without any record of the management's existing state of provision or actual need for them. In some oblasts and krays with a smaller percentage of provision (Chkalov Oblast, Kuybyshev Kray, Orlov Oblast, and others) a smaller number of tanks and petroleum containers were delivered, while in other oblasts and krays with a large or complete provision of containers (Moscow Oblast, etc) excessively more containers were delivered. Thus a disbalance was created between existing container capacity and actual demand for containers.

Foul enemies of the people have cultivated a lack of personal responsibility and a lack of control in petroleum management direction, and in the expenditure of fuel. The Fuel Sector of the NKZem USSR concerned itself only with distribution and with establishing fuel expenditure quotas for oblasts and krays. The fuel sectors of oblast land administrations were completely liquidated. However the direct control of MTS petroleum management was formally given to Narkomat production administrations in the absence of special workers who would have been responsible for this. The training of cadres of fuel workers was also disrupted and the role of MTS and sovkhoz petroleum management directors was lowered. In order to conceal their hostile activity in the sphere of agricultural fuel supply, the saboteurs have messed up the records of quantity and technical condition of sovkhoz and MTS petroleum management equipment, and also the records and checking of fuel distribution and expenditure

in MTS, sovkhoz, and tractor detachments. All this has led to the thriftless utilization of petroleum management equipment and to tremendous fuel losses both in MTS and sovkhoz managements and in the tractor brigades.

With the aid of the entire Soviet people, NKVD agencies have smashed the most important nests of Trotsky-Bukharin agents of fascism. However the consequences of sabotage in this sector are being liquidated at an extremely slow rate. Petroleum-base fuel losses in agriculture are still intolerably great. It is impossible to allow this in the future. One must remember that the party and the government are rendering constant aid to land agencies in organizing agricultural fuel supply and in introducing model bolshevist order when setting up MTS and sovkhoz petroleum managements. Tremendous amounts of capital, equipment, and construction materials are being released for petroleum managements. However, land agencies and MTS and sovkhoz directors still have not organized a real bolshevist struggle to introduce order into agricultural fuel supply. The NKZ and NKSovkhozov have still not got rid of their lack of personal responsibility in directing MTS and sovkhoz petroleum managements, or in planning for fuel, petroleum containers and petroleum management equipment. No real bolshevist struggle has been organized to save fuel, to study and eradicate all causes leading to tremendous fuel losses, or to eradicate fuel pilferage, its release to the outside, and all other non-productive expenditures. According to tentative calculations, direct losses and non-productive fuel expenditures in transportation, storage, refueling, and release to the outside comprise 10-12 percent, which represents 600-700 thousand tons of fuel, or in terms of cost in government-accepted graduated prices, more than 0.5 billion rubles a year.

It is quite understandable that the introducing of order into the job of directing and planning MTS and sovkhos petroleum managements, the organizing of the struggle against losses, the struggle to save each percent of fuel, and to use cheap kinds of fuel widely are tasks of exceptionally great importance to the national economy.

The struggle to save light types of fuel and lubricating oils in agriculture in the Third Five-Year Plan demands first of all the wide application and mastery of new, perfected diesel and gas-generator designs of tractors, trucks, and other mechanical engines operating on cheap types of fuel.

At the same time, sufficient attention is not yet being given to diesel tractors already operating on kolkhoz fields. The government and party decree aimed at the rapid mastery of diesel tractors is far from being fulfilled by land agencies and individual MTS directors. The situation is very bad with regard to the training of cadres of skilled tractor operators, brigade leaders, and diesel mechanics, and with regard to providing MTS with refueling apparatus and equipment for technical tractor maintenance. The achievements of individual Stakhanovites do not always become common knowledge. The better tractor operators of the Poltava MTS (Omsk Oblast) have achieved good results in diesel tractor operations. In many other MTS in the Omsk Oblast, diesels have occupied first place among the ChTZ with respect to output per tractor. Highest output on a diesel tractor in the Poltava MTS was achieved by tractor operators Comrade Kopyl -- 840 hectares (converted to light plowing), with a fuel saving of 1,137 kilograms of fuel, and Comrade Zakharenko, who had an output of 792 hectares, with a fuel saving of 1,345 kilograms.

In accordance with the government decree, the first trials of gas-generator tractors were conducted in autumn of 1938. These trials showed the tremendous advantages of gas-generator tractors, the wide application of which on kolkhoz fields has tremendous importance in saving petroleum-base fuel in agriculture.

The saving of petroleum products in agriculture also demands that the organization and technical condition of existing MTS and sovkhos petroleum managements be put in order.

The following are the basic causes of the tremendous fuel losses in MTS and sovkhoses:

I. Losses from poor organization and technical condition of MTS and sovkhos petroleum managements. To this category pertain:

(a) losses when MTS and sovkhoses receive fuel and lubricating materials from Soyuzneftesbyt bases;

(b) losses in transportation from Soyuzneftesbyt bases to MTS and sovkhos depots;

(c) losses in storage at MTS and sovkhos petroleum depots;

(d) losses in refueling tractors.

II. Fuel and lubricating material losses due to lack of order in organizing tractor brigade operations and the technical condition of the machines:

(a) non-productive fuel expenditures due to useless trips:

(b) idling the motor due to poor working condition of the tractor or trailer implements;

(c) insufficient tractor haulage due to failure to combine trailer machines.

III. Fuel losses and pilferage as a result of absence of careful records and checking in MTS and sovkhos managements and in tractor brigades.

Let us analyze in more detail certain causes and channels of fuel and oil losses, and ways of combatting them.

MTS and sovkhos petroleum management at the present time is not completely provided with necessary capacity of petroleum containers (stationary tanks, 72 percent; mobile, 80 percent). This can have a telling effect upon rates of fuel selection and upon the necessary stocks of fuel in MTS and sovkhos bases during the spring sowing campaign of 1939.

By the end of the spring field operations of 1938, a considerable number of stationary tanks were in a state of disrepair. Systematic petroleum container repair is not being carried out in MTS and sovkhoses, as a result of which the percentage of repair needed is extremely great. The number of MTS tanks needing capital repair comes to 25-30 percent for individual republics, krais, and oblasts. Stationary tanks frequently are not calked and fuel leaks out; barrel covers are for the most part made of wood and do not fit closely; tank hatches are not supplied with washers; stopcocks and valves are not ground down.

The technical condition of mobile tanks is also unsatisfactory.

The percentage of unserviceable tanks to the total number of them on hand comprises:

	<u>MTS</u>	<u>NKSKh Sovkhozes</u>
Truck tanks	27.0	23.1
Other mobile tanks	48.9	28.3

Due to the absence of mobile tanks in some oblasts and to the insufficiency of them in general, the number of truck tanks was not established for truck carriages (67.4 percent in MTS; 67.5 percent in sovkhoses of the NKSovkhozov. Thus the mechanization of fuel transportation stands at a low level. MTS were forced to convey fuel from Neftesbyt bases on horse-drawn carts, to great distances, because more than 70 percent of farms are located 11-50 kilometers or more from Soyuzneftesbyt bases.

A considerable quantity of truck tanks were bought by Nar-komzem USSR in 1937. The distribution of these tanks to individual krays and oblasts proceeded without taking into consideration the possibility of installing them on truck carriages. Truck tanks which are not installed on truck carriages are used as stationary containers. This is inexcusable, since 2-3 times more metal is used to make a truck tank than to make a stationary container.

Petroleum barrels are in poor condition due to tardy and low-quality repair, and also due to incorrect handling of them when shipping petroleum products. Of the total number of iron petroleum barrels, unserviceable barrels comprise 47.4 percent in MTS and 48.9 percent in sovkhoses. Of the total number of wooden petroleum barrels, unserviceable barrels comprise 35.3 percent in MTS and 32.3 percent in sovkhoses.

With careful handling, iron barrels can be used up to 15

years. As a matter of fact, however, their length of service does not exceed 4-5 years, due to careless handling. Poor maintenance of petroleum containers leads to premature deterioration and considerable fuel losses in transportation and storage.

Mechanization of refueling and decanting petroleum products is at an extremely low level. In the majority of MTS, tractors are refueled by buckets, directly from the barrels. Filling stations do not have a sufficient quantity of pumps, siphons, buckets, etc. Due to the insufficiency of refueling equipment, tractors stand idle at filling stations. The mechanization of refueling tractors and trucks is not becoming very widespread. The condition of refueling equipment and pumps is expressed in the following information:

	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Unserviceable</u> <u>in MTS</u>	<u>Percentage</u> <u>Unserviceable</u> <u>in Sovkhozes</u> <u>of NKSSovkhozov</u>
Refueling trucks	40.0	12.0
Refueling equipment on tractor bogies	23.3	29.2
Horse-drawn refueling equipment	38.2	15.1
Mechanical pumps	38.3	24.1
Hand pumps, all kinds	30.4	29.8

MTS have 44,900 hand pumps, but need more than 74,000 of them. Thus, extremely primitive and unproductive refueling means are employed to refuel MTS tractors. This leads to large fuel losses. According to information of the All-Union Institute of Mechanization, fuel losses when refueling tractors from a bucket, using a funnel, comprise 2.0 percent; from a bucket, using a siphon, 0.6 percent;

but when refueling with a pump, only 0.12 percent. In just pouring fuel from a barrel to a bucket, no less than 1 percent is lost. Low mechanization of refueling leads to fuel contamination, and this causes tractors and combines to stand idle.

MTS and sovkhoz depot management is being conducted in a negligent manner. One indication of this is the lack of enclosures at basic depots: 61.7 percent of sovkhoz and MTS petroleum managements do not have any depot enclosures. There are few depots or sheds for storing petroleum products in containers. In many MTS, barrels of fuel and lubricants lie open to the sky. Tanks are not equipped with basic apparatus (gate valves, fire alarms, breather valves, etc). Up to this moment there are no typical approved petroleum depot and equipment plans.

The presence of building and structures at basic depots is characterized by the following information:

	Percentage of Provision with Buildings and Structures at Basic Depots			
	Storage <u>Cellars</u>	Storage <u>Sheds</u>	Over- <u>flow</u>	<u>Pump</u>
MTS	35.1	7.3	16.6	7.7
Sovkhozes of NK	43.1	7.5	7.5	8.5

As a result of the extremely backward technical condition of MTS and sovkhoz petroleum depots, fuel losses are reaching great proportions.

The combat mission of land agencies, especially NKZ and Narkomsovkhozov USSR, consists in introducing order as soon as

possible into the construction and technical condition of MTS and sovkhos petroleum management and in getting them ready in an exemplary manner to receive fuel for the forthcoming spring sowing campaign of 1939. This will make it possible to save the country tens of thousands of tons of fuel.

The second source of losses and unproductive expenditures of fuel lies in the lack of order in organizing tractor brigade operations and in the poor condition of the machines. The tractor pool is utilized on field operations below full capacity because it is not provided with the necessary set of trailer machines and implements. The creation of a mighty technical base in agriculture demands that full correspondence be established between the number of unlike machines and tools and the number of tractors by brand types. As yet there is no such correspondence. Moreover, a considerable break has developed between tractors and trailer implements. From year to year the quantity of new agricultural machines drawn by tractors has increased, but this increase has lagged considerably behind the entry of tractors into MTS. Up to 1937 agriculture received fewer and fewer plows, sowing machines, and cultivators per each new tractor. For 100 delivered 15-power tractors, 88 moldboard ploughs were received in 1938; 69 in 1934; 59 in 1936; and only 41 in 1937. As a result, the rupture increased as follows:

<u>Machines and Tools</u>	<u>Machines Available for Each 100 15-power Tractors</u>					
	As of	As of	As of	As of	As of	As of
	1 Jan	1 Jan	1 Jan	1 Jan	1 Jan	1 Jan
	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939
Tractor plows	107	93	75	69	78	81
Tractor grain sowing machines	45	32	24	24	32	34

This rupture between tractors and machine pool is a result of the sabotage of enemies of the people who have run the show in land agencies. Just as a result of steps taken by the government, this rupture was significantly reduced in 1938. Due to the insufficiency of trailer equipment, MTS were forced to cut the number of tractor implements for mowing, were forced to combine horse-drawn equipment with tractor equipment, to use just horse-drawn equipment in operations, and, finally, to employ in operations tractor trailer implements which did not correspond to the given operations and which handled a narrower width. Ignoring questions of the correct combining of tractor aggregates, especially ChTZ, leads not only to a reduction in output per tractor and a breakdown in operation deadlines, but also to a considerable over-expenditure of fuel and oils.

The quality and technical condition of the tractor pool and trailer implements themselves are of great importance in saving fuel and raising machine productivity. Fuel expenditure is raised 3-4 percent when cultivators are operated with dull claws. This also occurs with a number of other tools. At the present time, due to the unsatisfactory condition of trailer implements, the traction resistance of the latter has been increased approximately 5 percent, and fuel expenditure is 2-3 percent more.

The phase lag which saboteurs created between agriculture's repair base and the growing tractor, combine, and truck pool is far from liquidated at this time. Tractors, especially engines, do not always receive high-quality repair. Due to unsatisfactorily conducted repairs, a considerable number of tractors were forced to stand idle during the fall-winter period of 1937-1938.

Poor carburetor repair and incorrect carburetor adjustment when in use cause large over-expenditures of fuel. Fuel losses due to poor carburetor condition comprise about 3 percent, on the average for the Union.

The lack of order in planning tractor brigade operations causes excessive, unproductive, useless trips from kolkhoz to kolkhoz or from one sector to another; this leads to large fuel losses. The percentage of fuel lost in useless tractor trips on MTS changed as follows during the Second Five-Year Plan:

	<u>1934</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1936</u>	<u>1937</u>
Fuel	4.2	5.0	3.8	3.7
Lubricating Oils	--	3.8	2.7	3.3

In 1937, MTS tractors expended about 4 percent of their fuel and 3.3 percent of their lubricating oils in useless trips.

We have many MTS and tractor brigades which use fuel carefully and economically in their brigades, which rationally plan tractor brigade operations, and which observe the rules for technical maintenance of machines. The Azov MTS, Rostov Oblast, and Dzhulinka MTS, Vinnitsa Oblast, can serve as examples.

Many tractor operators are models of socialist relations to public property. For example, Comrades Kabanets and Sosedka (Dashkovo MTS, Poltava Oblast) saved almost one-half ton of fuel in 12 days of operations. Tractor operators of the Ozero MTS of the same Oblast, I. Moroz and Ya. Onishchenko, are also saving much fuel. Stakhanovites of socialist agriculture, Comrades Kovardak, Angelina, Palagutin, Borin, Oskin, and others have frequently provided models of organizing tractor brigade operations,

of high output per machine, and fuel savings. The experience of advanced Stakhanovites shows what tremendous reserves can result from saving fuel in tractor brigades.

Thus, the correct organization and planning of tractor brigade operations, timely, high-quality tractor and machine repair, and daily maintenance of tractors and machines before they go into the field, together with careful coupling and adjusting of trailer implements, will yield tremendous savings in fuel and lubricating oils for each MTS and sovkhoz.

However, one must touch upon questions of records and checking. The lack of order of low-level records in MTS, sovkhozes, and tractor brigades are creating conditions for negligent and uncontrolled fuel handling.

In accordance with government decision, land agencies, and MTS directors are obliged to keep an exact record and check of fuel expenditure, both in MTS management and in the tractor brigades. At the same time, in a considerable number of MTS, fuel records are kept completely unsatisfactorily, or are not kept at all. This gives rise to pilferages, uncontrolled release to the outside, utilization of fuel for management needs, and failure on the part of MTS petroleum management directors to record fuel for tractor brigades, etc. Material from MTS annual reports confirms that this practice is sufficiently wide-spread. In the make-up of all fuel expenditures, expenditure to the outside comprises 2-3 percent each year; fuel expenditure for office illumination and MTS farmsteads comprises 0.5 percent; for running in tractors, more than 0.5 percent; etc. All other non-productive fuel expenditures of MTS are entered in the column "Other expenses", which in 1937 comprise

more than 1 percent of the total fuel expenditures for the year. Shortages and natural losses have a high relative participation in MTS fuel balance sheets. This negligent attitude towards fuel expenditure is a completely inadmissible violation of the government directive concerning the prohibition against using fuel stocks intended for MTS and sovkhov production needs, for other purposes.

The absence of accurately kept fuel records in MTS and tractor brigades does not stimulate brigade leaders or tractor operators to struggle to save fuel or to collect used lubricating oils.

The lack of order in fuel records, and the completely insufficient struggle to save fuel are explained to a considerable degree by the fact that petroleum management direction in MTS has been entrusted to people who are technically untrained. There are extremely few people among those directing petroleum managements who have had special training (12-15 percent). Land agencies do not organize courses for raising the degree of skill of petroleum management directors, just as in the NKZ and NKSOvkhozov system there are no teaching establishments which train directing personnel of MTS and sovkhov fuel managements.

Together with the rational organization of sovkhov and MTS petroleum managements, and the introduction of order into tractor brigade operations, and into records and check of fuel expenditure, one of the most important sources of fuel saving in agriculture is the improvement in establishing fuel expenditure quotas. Up to the present time, the majority of krais and oblasts have differentiated only fuel expenditure quotas for plowing, and even these are completely inaccurate. At the same time, fuel expenditures for all

operations without exception depend upon a number of specific conditions (terrain, time of year, character of soil, dampness, etc). Each MTS and sovkhov has its own peculiarities and must have individual quotas for all types of tractor operations drawn up for it. In turn, MTS and sovkhovs must differentiate among brigade quotas, depending upon sector, character of operations, and time of year.

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The task of land agencies and MTS and sovkhov directors consists in setting petroleum managements in order, in training them in an exemplary manner to meet the spring sowing campaign, and in organizing a real bolshevist struggle against fuel losses and pilferages. Land agencies, primarily NKZ and NKSOvkhozov USSR, are obliged to liquidate, in as short a time as possible, the results of sabotage in petroleum management and fuel planning, and are obliged to introduce bolshevist order into the direction of this extremely important sector of socialist economy.

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